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ASOC deployment architecture

ASOC Reference Architecture · Slide 1 of 2

Defense in Depth: where Secure, Assure, and SOAR install, what crosses, how action returns

01
Customer-controlled environment — controls, data and owners stay here

Datacenter / campus

Firewall / WAFPerimeter policy
IDS / NDRNetwork detection
EDR / MDMEndpoint control
Vuln mgmtScan + patch
AD / PAMPrivileged access
KMS / PKIKey + cert authority
DNS securityResolution policy
MicrosegmentationEast-west control
Secure live sensorSPAN / TAP · packet metadata · signed findings · rolling local buffer

Branch / remote / OT

SD-WANSite routing
Branch firewallLocal enforcement
OT passive tapProtocol-aware sensor
AllowlistingApplication control
Local EDROffline-capable
Segment isolationAuto-quarantine
Local recoverySite-safe rollback
Physical accessBadge / camera log
ASOC connector runtimeVM or container in-zone · polls native APIs · receives webhooks

Cloud / SaaS / delivery

IAMCloud identity
CSPM / KSPMPosture mgmt
VPC flow / WAFTraffic + edge policy
KMS / DLPData protection
Backup / DRRecovery state
CASB / SaaS auditSaaS control plane
CI / CDBuild + release
SAST / SBOMCode + supply chain
ASOC cloud + build hooksLeast-privilege API identity per account · read-only posture and audit
Local evidence vaultRaw PCAP · payloads, encrypted — upload disabled without named approval
SOAR execution relaySOAR’s own execution engine — config change, patch, replay under approved scope
BNetwork boundaryF
ASOC platform — SaaS or customer-hosted cluster
API gateway + ingestionauthn · schema · rate limit · tenant isolation
B
SecureObserveAssets, exposure graph, reachability, attack paths, PQC discovery
Asset inventoryLive and continuous
Exposure graphReachability paths
Attack path analysisCross-layer chains
C
AssureValidateClaim replay, provenance, coverage, code and control evidence
Claim replayAgainst the source
Provenance chainSigned, versioned
Coverage scoringPlus human review
D
SOARDetect · Decide · ExecuteFive air-gapped cyber LLMs — anomaly detection, config change, patching, network replay
Anomaly detection5 air-gapped LLMs
Config change + patchDirect execution
Network replayLive sensor tasking
EPolicy + authority gateRBAC / ABAC scope · named-owner approval · timeout and blast radiusGoverns what SOAR is already able to execute — signs scope, expiry, rollback
Asset + relationship graphTenant-isolated, encrypted graph persistence
Evidence + audit storeImmutable, signed, retained records
Operations planeHealth · backup / DR · PAM-only key rotation
Telemetry / evidenceA Traffic flow step Product-installed component

Raw PCAP stays local unless explicitly approved

ASOC · DEPLOYMENT ARCHITECTURE · 01 / 11

ASOC Reference Architecture · Post-quantum extension

Post-quantum security sheets continue the architecture deck.

The next 13 sheets use the same implementation-note structure as the architecture deck and focus on Secure crypto inventory, Mosca urgency scoring, claim validation, and governed migration response.

ASOC REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE · POST-QUANTUM SHEET · portfolio thesis

Post-quantum security gap

01

A vendor upgrade can make a component PQC capable. It does not prove that the organization’s real traffic paths are PQC protected.

The executive problem

The board asks for protection, but the estate only reports capability

PQC migration often gets reduced to a software replacement program: update libraries, firmware, HSMs, operating systems, and appliances.

The hard question remains: which communications negotiated safe cryptography, which paths fell back to classical algorithms, and who accepted the residual risk?

Violet quantum security architecture motif.
ASOC pitch

ASOC turns post-quantum migration into observed evidence, validated claims, and governed response.

CapabilityConfigurationObserved behaviorRequired policy
Secure observes the estateAssure validates the claimSOAR governs the action

Raw packet capture stays local unless a named owner approves retrieval. Claims, metadata, and approved actions cross the ASOC control plane.

ASOC draft reference architecture

ASOC REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE · POST-QUANTUM SHEET · crypto baseline

Cryptography changes, architecture remains

02

PQC changes the public-key algorithms used for key establishment and signatures. Bulk encryption still relies on fast symmetric cryptography such as AES.

Current model

Classical public-key algorithms carry today’s trust

Key establishmentECDHE, ECDH, Diffie-Hellman
AuthenticationRSA, ECDSA, certificate chains
Bulk encryptionAES session keys
Post-quantum model

Standardized PQC algorithms replace the vulnerable public-key layer

Key establishmentML-KEM or hybrid classical plus PQC
AuthenticationML-DSA or SLH-DSA where supported
Bulk encryptionAES remains the high-speed data cipher
Why this matters

Inventory alone cannot answer readiness

The practical question sits inside each handshake and each trust boundary: what algorithm was negotiated, what certificate authenticated the peer, and does that match policy for this path?

Raw packet capture stays local unless a named owner approves retrieval. Claims, metadata, and approved actions cross the ASOC control plane.

ASOC draft reference architecture

ASOC REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE · POST-QUANTUM SHEET · handshake mechanics

Key exchange does not prove identity

03

A connection can have strong key establishment and still authenticate the wrong party. PQC migration must cover both shared secrets and identity binding.

Confidential key establishment

Two systems derive shared secret material that feeds symmetric session encryption.

Current: ECDHEPQC target: ML-KEM or hybrid KEM

Endpoint authentication

A certificate and signature bind the public key to an identity and prove private-key possession.

Current: RSA and ECDSAPQC target: ML-DSA or SLH-DSA where the ecosystem supports it
Implementation implication

Secure needs evidence from both sides of the handshake

Secure records negotiated key establishment, certificate chain, signature algorithm, endpoint identity, and source of observation. Assure replays whether that evidence supports the claim. SOAR acts only after policy and owner approval.

Raw packet capture stays local unless a named owner approves retrieval. Claims, metadata, and approved actions cross the ASOC control plane.

ASOC draft reference architecture

ASOC REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE · POST-QUANTUM SHEET · vendor-upgrade gap

PQC capable does not mean PQC protected

04

A server can support hybrid PQC while real clients still negotiate classical key exchange through old libraries, proxies, or fallback behavior.

Server after upgradeX25519 · secp256r1 · X25519 plus ML-KEM hybrid
Client AHybrid PQ negotiated
Client BFallback to X25519
Client CLegacy library path
Observed protected path Observed vulnerable paths
Why the gap happens

Capability can diverge from traffic

Old clients, load balancers, TLS termination, protocol limits, unsupported downstream services, and misconfiguration can all cause a classical negotiation even when the upgraded component advertises PQC support.

Raw packet capture stays local unless a named owner approves retrieval. Claims, metadata, and approved actions cross the ASOC control plane.

ASOC draft reference architecture

ASOC REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE · POST-QUANTUM SHEET · security-state model

Security-state model

05

Secure should model each state separately, then calculate the gap between required policy and observed behavior.

CapabilityWhat the component can do
ConfigurationWhat the team enabled
ObservationWhat traffic actually negotiated
PolicyWhat critical paths require
GapWhat remains exposed
Capability evidenceVendor version, firmware, library, HSM support, protocol interrogation
Observed evidenceTLS version, KEM, signature, cipher, certificate, source packet or scan
Policy evidenceCriticality, data class, trust boundary, required algorithm, exception owner
Secure observes the estateAssure validates the claimSOAR governs the action

Raw packet capture stays local unless a named owner approves retrieval. Claims, metadata, and approved actions cross the ASOC control plane.

ASOC draft reference architecture

ASOC REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE · POST-QUANTUM SHEET · quantum timing model

Mosca calculation in Secure

06

Secure should calculate quantum urgency per relationship: protect first where data shelf life plus migration time exceeds the credible quantum threat horizon.

SShelf life

How long the data or transaction must stay confidential after capture.

+
MMigration time

How long the owner needs to upgrade, test, approve, and deploy PQC controls.

>
QQuantum horizon

Estimated time until cryptographically relevant quantum capability threatens the algorithm.

Secure calculation inputs

Secure turns Mosca from a policy worksheet into an evidence-backed risk graph

RelationshipSource, destination, protocol, business owner, data class, trust boundary
Observed cryptoTLS version, KEM, signature algorithm, cipher, certificate chain, fallback behavior
Timing pressureShelf life plus migration time compared with the selected quantum horizon scenario
Priority outputUrgent, scheduled, monitored, or accepted with named owner and compensating control
Urgent when S + M exceeds QScheduled when migration completes before the risk window closesMonitored when the installation lacks enough evidence to score confidence

Raw packet capture stays local unless a named owner approves retrieval. Claims, metadata, and approved actions cross the ASOC control plane.

ASOC draft reference architecture

ASOC REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE · POST-QUANTUM SHEET · crypto topology

Relationship-level cryptography

07

Cryptographic security happens on communication relationships, so Secure must treat edges as first-class evidence objects.

A
Hybrid PQ
B
ECDHE
C
ECDHE
E
ML-KEM
D
Relationship record

The evidence object that decides protection

Source identity, destination identity, protocol, TLS version, key establishment, signature algorithm, cipher, certificate, trust chain, first observed, last observed, evidence source, confidence, and policy status.

Raw packet capture stays local unless a named owner approves retrieval. Claims, metadata, and approved actions cross the ASOC control plane.

ASOC draft reference architecture

ASOC REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE · POST-QUANTUM SHEET · market gap

Why vendor tools leave blind spots

08

Each vendor can correctly report its own PQC support while the end-to-end customer path remains partially vulnerable.

1Clientobserved
2Ciscovendor claim
3F5unknown edge
4API gatewayobserved
5Java appvendor claim
6Kafkaunknown edge
7Oracleobserved
8HSMvendor claim
Vendor view

Support status for one component

Version 12.4 supports ML-KEM. The claim can be true and still fail to prove the customer’s full application path.

ASOC view

Observed behavior across the customer estate

Secure maps the path. Assure validates claims against evidence. SOAR routes approved remediation when a path violates policy.

Raw packet capture stays local unless a named owner approves retrieval. Claims, metadata, and approved actions cross the ASOC control plane.

ASOC draft reference architecture

ASOC REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE · POST-QUANTUM SHEET · reusable primitive

The same gap beyond PQC

09

Expected security state versus observed security state applies to TLS, certificates, segmentation, and legacy services.

TLS

Version drift

Policy requires TLS 1.3. Secure observes TLS 1.2, TLS 1.0, and plaintext on real device paths.

Certificates

Trust-chain drift

Policy expects approved enterprise certificates. Secure finds expired, self-signed, or unexpected certificates on alternate ports.

Segmentation

Reachability drift

Policy allows camera-to-NVR traffic. Observation shows extra routes to internet, PLC, or corporate database targets.

Legacy services

Protocol drift

Policy allows SSH. Observation finds HTTPS, Telnet, SNMPv2c, or vendor maintenance services still reachable.

Product thesis

PQC becomes one use case of a broader verification architecture

The same Secure, Assure, and SOAR primitives can track required state, observed state, evidence source, claim confidence, named owner, and governed response.

Raw packet capture stays local unless a named owner approves retrieval. Claims, metadata, and approved actions cross the ASOC control plane.

ASOC draft reference architecture

ASOC REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE · POST-QUANTUM SHEET · legacy estate

Legacy systems and residual risk

10

ASOC should never claim a legacy device became quantum-safe if the device still talks classically inside a local segment.

PLCNo PQC patch guaranteed
CameraNo PQC patch guaranteed
BMS controllerNo PQC patch guaranteed
Medical deviceNo PQC patch guaranteed
Badge readerNo PQC patch guaranteed
HVACNo PQC patch guaranteed
PrinterNo PQC patch guaranteed
IoT sensorNo PQC patch guaranteed
Protected truth

Boundary traffic can gain PQC or hybrid protection

Gateway-to-gateway communication can use a secure overlay when traffic crosses a defined trust boundary.

Residual truth

The local device segment may remain classical

ASOC records that residual exposure, the compensating controls, and the named risk owner instead of overstating safety.

Raw packet capture stays local unless a named owner approves retrieval. Claims, metadata, and approved actions cross the ASOC control plane.

ASOC draft reference architecture

ASOC REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE · POST-QUANTUM SHEET · enforcement architecture

Secure overlay at trust boundaries

11

The overlay should protect selected boundary crossings, not blindly tunnel every packet everywhere.

OT zone

PLCCameraHMIBMSIoTHVAC
ASOC gateway
PQ or hybrid protected overlayEncapsulated legacy traffic
ASOC gateway

Datacenter

AppsSIEMNVRHSMAPI
Implementation boundary

What the slide proves

The legacy endpoint remains unchanged. The original packet gets encapsulated by the gateway. The receiving gateway decrypts and forwards the original traffic. ASOC records which segment stayed classical and which boundary received protection.

Raw packet capture stays local unless a named owner approves retrieval. Claims, metadata, and approved actions cross the ASOC control plane.

ASOC draft reference architecture

ASOC REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE · POST-QUANTUM SHEET · platform architecture

Secure, Assure, and SOAR architecture

12

Secure and Assure feed the control plane. SOAR governs the response and can task the data plane under approved scope.

Secure product logo visual from the ASOC homepage.

Secure

Observe

Maps assets, crypto posture, reachability, attack paths, unsupported systems, and communication relationships.

Assure product logo visual from the ASOC homepage.

Assure

Validate

Replays claims against evidence sources, attaches provenance and coverage, and marks stale or unsupported claims.

SOAR product logo visual from the ASOC homepage.

SOAR

Govern and execute

Opens cases, routes approvals, signs action scope, tasks relays or gateways, and verifies the result.

Control plane: discovery, identity, topology, policy, risk, path computationData plane: tunneling, encryption, segmentation, traffic steering, allowlisting

Raw packet capture stays local unless a named owner approves retrieval. Claims, metadata, and approved actions cross the ASOC control plane.

ASOC draft reference architecture

ASOC REFERENCE ARCHITECTURE · POST-QUANTUM SHEET · operating model

Closed-loop operating model

13

The roadmap should come from the gaps ASOC observes: unsupported devices, vulnerable paths, unvalidated claims, missing policy, and action workflows.

ADiscover
BIdentify
CObserve
DAssess
EMitigate
FVerify
GMonitor

Roadmap from gaps

can turn every unresolved condition into a product roadmap item: raw packet retention, standardized gateway placement, PQC handshake evidence, certificate provenance, policy authoring, approval routing, local relay execution, and post-action verification.

Open deployment architecture